Globalization and democracy
Contemporary experiences demonstrate that the relationship between development and democracy represents a two-way path: democracy provides. Topics: Relationship democracy and sustainable development. Download PDF. At one level, the ideas and reality of sustainable development and democracy. democracy in a system.9 The linearity of the relationship has been The three questions in part A require cross-sectional analysis of countries at one time.
Similarly, if a democratic country's economy slipped it would eventually become less democratic. What does a developed economy look like?
The Relationship between Democracy and Sustainable Development - FDSD
Of course, this research will very highly depend on how you measure the state of an economy. A developed economy should be higher in urbanization. This does tend to happen as an economy develops agricultural workers move to urban areas to take jobs in manufacturing, and eventually the manufacturing jobs are lost to service jobs. Back in the hey-day of modernization theory, this was measured as the number of telephones per 1, people.
Not only can a developed nation afford telephones, communication lines are valuable for economic growth. A developed nation has a well-educated work force. The reasoning is again two-fold: More income per person should generally indicate a more developed economy.
The modernization "story" The common story of modernization theory begins with an undeveloped, authoritarian government. With time the economy grows, resulting in higher wages and standards of living. Once they have leisure time, people will want education, better quality of goods, and entertainment. These people will increasingly demand better education for their kids so they can also find good jobsbasic freedoms to express their views, and government support for programs that will improve their lives such as social welfare programs or education funding.
At this point the government will either cave to that pressure and democratize, or it will crush democracy movements in turn destroying the kinds of citizens it needs to maintain its economy. Empirical Support There is a very clear empirical regularity here: There is a need for transparency in the advice donors give to African governments.
When projects [that have been agreed on behind closed doors] fail, the onus is put on African governments. Page 38 Share Cite Suggested Citation: One participant stated, "Having worked for several aid agencies, I will add that the donors need to undertake governance reforms. I hope that the progressive and democratic forces in Africa both during and after the transition will demand those reforms of the donors. For example, demand the publication of confidential reports of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
They are confidential only in lessening the level of accountability of these agencies to populations and opposition. I think there should be much more transparency in the policy-making process, especially during structural adjustment negotiations. That lack of transparency has satisfied only the donors and the governments, and it will be interesting to see, after the transition, whether newly democratic governments will open up this process to the press, and I think they should, because it will much improve the structural adjustment process.
In most African countries, corruption constitutes an important means by which individual wants and needs, especially in patronage-ridden personal regimes, can be satisfied. Although corruption is a general problem for all governments, governments of developing countries tend to exhibit the problem in a particularly noteworthy way.
In countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zaire, and the Central African Republic, corruption is so extensive that it is viewed as a way of life. Making or receiving bribes in most African countries is considered a practical tactic to look after one's needs and interests, achieving incomes and security far greater than provided by one's monthly salary. Because of an absence of effective structures with autonomy and strength to check corruption, the governing elites of most African countries have engaged in high and sometimes egregious levels of corruption, increasingly diverting state resources for personal gain.Democracy and Development: Perspectives from Africa - MITx on edX - Course About Video
In Zaire, for example, one participant mentioned that corruption has been termed a structural fact, with as much as 60 percent of the annual budget misappropriated by the governing elite. Foreign aid, noted the participants, although designed to contribute to development, also has served as an alternative source of wealth for corrupt elites. It was also pointed out that, to the extent that government has been immersed in patron-client relations and in cases in which state office is granted as a means to amass personal wealth, corruption has increased in scale and proportion.
One significant suggestion advanced by participants in both the Benin and Namibia workshops was that public monies siphoned off by corrupt leaders and public officials and deposited in the West must be returned. They made a plea for donors to suggest steps that African countries could take that might help retrieve the stolen money deposited in foreign accounts by these public officials. One participant stated, "Stolen monies do not belong to the few individuals who perpetrated the thefts.
The people of African countries were robbed. If donors were to try to help get this money back, it maybe would contribute to democracy and democratization. Although participants acknowledged that corruption in Africa emanated from the lack of democracy and accountability, they emphasized that corruption is not unique to Africa and also may be found in liberal democratic systems.
Consequently, they were of the opinion that the real issue is the absence of institutions capable of tackling corruption. As one participant argued, "With regard to corruption and stolen money, my own advice is to let sleeping dogs lie and engage ourselves more in how to create institutions that will help make a repeat performance impossible.
I also think we can suggest to donors that we want a change in the form in which aid comes. For example, donors no longer should give direct monetary aid, because this can be misutilized, but could provide assistance in other ways that would ensure it is effectively utilized. For example, it was stated that almost everywhere in Africa "radio and television are under direct government control. Radio is often particularly important in rural areas, and among people not literate in European languages, whereas newspapers are expensive to run and can be subject to government censorship or indirect pressures over matters such as the supply of newsprint.
In countries like Mozambique, the media were assigned a political role as agents of mobilization. In South Africa, although restrictions have been eased, newspapers still retain a high degree of self-censorship.
It was acknowledged, however, that professional training is needed for journalists, especially in countries whose press has been under state control. One participant called for African journalists to train younger colleagues, organize themselves into associations and trade unions, and to sponsor conferences around the issue of the press and democracy. These steps, he offered, "could contribute to the emergence of a free and independent press in Africa, with persistent reporting in turn contributing to improved governance.
It also was pointed out that reforms of press laws will be required in a number of countries. Some participants advocated that a code of ethics for the press be instituted simultaneously with such new laws. As one participant illustrated, "ultimately, freedom of the press reflects the freedom of society itself. In countries such as Swaziland and Zambia, the refusal of the press to be coopted was a major factor contributing to an open society.
In Nigeria, there are over 50 newspapers and lots of magazines, with many of them in local languages and dialects. Generally, the more press there is, the greater the difficulty government has in suppressing it.
Participants indicated that regular indigenous institutions for monitoring should be established, although assistance from international civil society also could be very supportive, ideas that will be discussed further in the next chapter.
The use of alternative media, such as drama, news murals, and posters to educate people about rights was also recommended. Participants noted that, in politically fragmented countries, decentralization might allow the various political, religious, ethnic, or tribal groups greater representation in development decision making, thereby increasing their stake in maintaining political stability.
One participant convincingly argued, "With reference to decentralization, I would simply like to say that we have to look at things from the point of view of democratic society.
Are we going to tolerate diversity? If it's a dialogue among peers, then we can't concentrate the political and economic power in the hands of just a few people. I think we have to tolerate this diversity, and political and economic decentralization should be admitted as having the right to exist.
We do not have to try to achieve uniformity because it is perhaps not the best thing. I think that decentralization of power is not bad.
It will, of course mean that there is a limitation on the centralization of power in both the political and economic fields. Political centralization has led to economic centralization, which has led to economic crisis. Institutionally, because most African countries are overly centralized, there needs to be both horizontal and vertical decentralization of power. Participants further pointed out that the power and authority of most African heads of state blatantly override the powers of the legislature and the judiciary.
In other words, because of the personalization of power by the rulers, an enormous gap exists between the rulers and the people. In some African countries, constitutions and other laws have been revised to give rulers the right to exercise exceptional powers. Most participants believed that, in the future, it would be necessary to limit the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the executive in order to ensure some level of accountability through the other branches of government.
There was a clear sense that the role of the centralized state must be limited. As one person suggested: The state's monopoly control must be broken down. The formal structures in the state are highly centralized, whatever way you look at it. This is the problem as far as the issue of centralization is concerned. One participant advocated that the state communicate with societal elements, such as clans and tribes, and not just with one ethnic group in society: Decentralization will be territorial and ethnic based.
Another participant, however, cautioned that decentralization should not be allowed to result in the replacement of authentic, grass roots leaders with party members. Moreover, trade-offs may be a continuum rather than binary choices, which means that it may be possible to have more of two and less of the third. In other words, there could be more choices within and between the three nodes whereas the trilemma only allows choosing two from three. The fundamental problem with such an analytical construct is that it suggests a false precision which is deceptive if not misleading.
Of course, in reality, there are conflicts between objectives or desired states. And, wherever there are conflicts, there are bound to be trade-offs. Hence, there are choices to be made. But these should not be reduced to: In this context, there is something to learn from a historical perspective.
Globalization in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, as much as the earlier era of globalization during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, represents neither the end of history nor the end of geography Nayyar, It is not the end of history, now as it was not then, because markets and globalization may not be the dominant mode for the world economy in perpetuity.
It may have been a world war then and it is the economic crisis now that has created doubts about the wisdom and necessity of deepening economic integration in the world economy.
And there was life after globalization then as there will be now. It is not the end of geography, because nation states cannot exist in a vacuum and most must strive to improve the economic conditions of their people to whom governments are accountable.
It is clear that the nation state is a reality that has not withered away. There has been an erosion in its economic space but not in its political space. This reality has been brought home by the global economic crisis Nayyar, At the same time, democratic politics is an aspiration that is on the rise everywhere. The spread of political democracy has coincided in time with the advent of market economy.
There are fewer authoritarian regimes and more democratic regimes. In sum, the nation state is a reality embedded in history that has emerged stronger from the global economic crisis. Democratic politics, which has gathered both momentum and strength in the recent past, is increasingly a prior, as there is a rights consciousness among citizens.
In contrast, the degree of international economic integration is a matter of strategic choice in terms of speed, sequence and engagement. It depends on choices made by the nation state where, ultimately, governments can decide only in accordance with preferences of people.
And if it produces unequal outcomes, globalization is unsustainable in terms of both economics and politics. The causation is interactive as it runs in both directions and the relationship is dialectical as one shapes the other. The essence of the tension between the economics of markets and the politics of democracy must be recognized. In a market economy, people vote with their money in the market place. The underlying principle is one-dollar-one-vote. But a political democracy works on the basis of one-person-one-vote Bhaduri and Nayyar, The distribution of votes, unlike the distribution of incomes or assets, is equal.
One adult has one vote in politics, even though a rich person has more votes than a poor person, in terms of purchasing power, in the market. This tension may be compounded by a related asymmetry between economy and polity.
The people who are excluded by the economics of markets are included by the politics of democracy. Hence, exclusion and inclusion are asymmetrical in economics and politics. The distribution of capabilities is also uneven in the economic and political spheres.
The rich dominate a market economy in terms of purchasing power. But the poor have a strong voice in a political democracy in terms of votes. And there is a mismatch. It is clear that, in reconciling market economy and political democracy, a sensible compromise must be reached between the economic directions that the market sets on the basis of purchasing power and the priorities that a political system sets on the basis of one-person-one-vote.
In this context, it is not surprising that successive generations of economic thinkers and social philosophers have stressed the role of the State in this process of mediation. The reason is important even if it is not obvious.
Governments are accountable to their people, whereas markets are not. In a democracy, of course, governments are elected by the people. But even where they are not, the state needs legitimization from the people, most of whom are not rich or are poor. The task of reconciliation and mediation is obviously difficult but clearly necessary Nayyar, a.
The Relationship between Democracy and Sustainable Development
Markets are responsive to the demands of rich people and not to the needs of the poor people. This is inherent in the logic of markets where decisions about what is produced are based on demand and not on need. Thus, markets produce goods for which there is enough purchasing power.
The output-mix depends upon the composition of expenditure and the size of the market. Since the rich have more purchasing power, markets, left to themselves, are likely to produce more soft drinks and not safer drinking water. In this manner, markets include people with entitlements but exclude people without entitlements. In theory, every economic agent has the freedom to choose.
In practice, there is a choice for some but not for others. And there is more choice for some than for others. Democracies are more responsive to people with a voice than to people at large.
People without a political voice are often simply neglected. There are, of course, problems associated with majority rule which might lead some democracies to exclude minorities. Even if we abstract from such problems, however, the principle of one-person-one-vote does not make every citizen equal in a political democracy.
For, in the real world, social and economic inequalities are inevitably reflected in the political process. In theory, democracy provides every citizen political freedom in the form of civil rights and political liberties. In practice, there is freedom for some but not for others. And there is more freedom for some than for others. It is only to be expected that there is an interaction between exclusion from the market in the economic sphere and exclusion from democracy in the political sphere.
An economic exclusion from livelihood often creates or accentuates a political exclusion from rights. Thus, for the poor in a democracy the right to vote may exist in principle, but in practice it may be taken away by coercion or coaxed away by material incentives at the time of elections.
Similarly, the very poor are vulnerable to exploitation or oppression because their civil rights or equality before the law exists in principle but are difficult to protect or preserve in practice.
The reason is simple. They do not have the resources to claim or the power to assert their rights. Exclusion extends beyond the economic and the political to the social and cultural spheres. The social manifestations of exclusion can be powerful. At the same time, economic exclusion accentuates social exclusion, while social exclusion accentuates political exclusion.
Similarly, cultural exclusion such as that of immigrant groups, minority communities or ethnic groups interacts with economic exclusion from the market and political exclusion from democracy. Clearly, there is an overlap between those excluded by market economy and those excluded by political democracy, just as there is an overlap between those included by market economy and those included by political democracy. The poor who are marginalized in the economy also do not have a voice in the polity, just as the rich who are dominant in the economy also have a strong political voice.
Economic deprivation and political marginalization go hand-in-hand in much the same way as economic strength and political power go hand-in-hand. There are two underlying factors. For one, the economy and the polity are connected and interdependent.
For another, there is no equality among economic agents or political citizens in terms of their economic or political freedom to choose. There is, in fact, a hierarchy of freedoms, with more for some and less for others, where there is a significant overlap in the economic and political sphere. These two propositions add to our understanding of the interaction between markets and democracy Nayyar, a. It needs to be said that the liberal paradox is much deeper.
On the one hand, markets exclude people without entitlements, assets or capabilities. It is in the logic of markets.
Yet, markets would like to include as many people as possible. For, in the words of Adam Smith: On the other hand, democracy includes people by a constitutional right to vote. It is the foundation of democracy. Yet, political processes seek to exclude or to marginalize those without a voice. That is what the pursuit and exercise of political power is about. The irony of this paradoxical situation is striking.
Indeed, this twist in the tale further highlights the dialectics of the interaction between market economy and political democracy. This dialectical relationship between markets and democracy, as also the interaction between economic and politics, becomes more complex when globalized economies are juxtaposed with national polities.
However, the essential tensions, asymmetries, overlaps and paradoxes remain similar. The dialectical relationship also remains. Even so, two questions arise. First, how does a market economy, which is more global than local, influence national politics differently? Second, how does political democracy influence a globalized market economy differently, when compared with a national market economy that is much less integrated with the outside world? Indeed, the space for, and autonomy to formulate policies in the pursuit of national development objectives is significantly diminished.
This is so for two reasons: In a world of unequal partners, it is not surprising that the rules of the game are asymmetrical in terms of construct and inequitable in terms of outcome.
The strong have the power to make the rules and the authority to implement the rules. In contrast, the weak can neither set nor invoke the rules Nayyar, The problem, however, takes different forms. First, there are different rules in different spheres. The rules of the game for the international trading system, being progressively set in the WTO, illustrate this with clarity. There are striking asymmetries. National boundaries should not matter for trade flows and capital flows but should be clearly demarcated for technology flows and labour flows.
It follows that developing countries would provide access to their markets without a corresponding access to technology and would accept capital mobility without a corresponding provision for labour mobility.
This implies more openness in some spheres but less openness in other spheres. The contrast between the free movement of capital and the unfree movement of labour across national boundaries lies at the heart of the inequality in the rules of the game.
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Second, there are rules for some but not for others. There are no rules for surplus countries, or even deficit countries, in the industrialized world, which do not borrow from the multilateral financial institutions. But the Bretton Woods twins set rules for borrowers in the developing world and in the transition economies. In effect, IMF programmes of stabilization and World Bank programmes of structural adjustment seek to harmonize policies and institutions across countries, which is in consonance with the needs of globalization.
Third, the agenda for new rules is partisan. There is an attempt on the part of industrialized countries to create new multilateral agreements in the WTO, in many spheres, which is partly responsible for the impasse in the Doha Round.
The primary object of this exercise is to set rules for a deeper integration in the world economy.