Pashtun and hazara relationship marketing

Pashtuns attacked in brutal raids by rival ethnic groups | World news | The Guardian

pashtun and hazara relationship marketing

Hazara civilians in particular suffered extreme persecution at the hands of of the conflict lies a new hatred of Pashtuns who, rightly or wrongly. The relationship between tribe and ethnicity is complex, and by no Canfield has observed that in Barman, "some Hazaras [who are In addition, there are Pashtuns and Tajiks in the area who are traders supplying market. This report uses the Hazara-Pashtun relationship as a proxy for ethnic .. Save marketing and sales, Pashtuns tend not to be involved in Pakistan's thriving.

It is mute testimony to their fear of the Taliban that a number of Hazaras have tried a number of times to get here by boat, despite the dangers of the voyage After the allied invasion of Afghanistan in lateand the overthrow of the Taliban, the Howard Government forced a number of Hazaras to return from Nauru to Afghanistan. Most fled immediately to Pakistan. Some returned to their villages in Afghanistan.

Some of them have since been killed by the Taliban who, though no longer in government, nevertheless have substantial power in Afghanistan.

The fate of Hazaras returned to Afghanistan from Nauru has been well documented by the Edmund Rice Centre, in their compelling report Deported to Danger. In recent times, Hazaras from Afghanistan still form one of the major groups of boat arrivals in Australia seeking asylum.

It is mute testimony to their fear of the Taliban that a number of Hazaras have tried a number of times to get here by boat, despite the dangers of the voyage. Presumably, the Expert Panel and the Gillard Government think that Australia can so mistreat boat people as to make coming to Australia look more alarming than staying home and facing the Taliban. The Hazaras arrived in Afghanistan seven or eight hundred years ago.

pashtun and hazara relationship marketing

Most people remember that in February of the Taliban demolished the great Bamiyan Buddhas. These two enormous Buddhas were hewn into the cliff face by Hazaras six or seven hundred years ago, because when the Hazaras arrived in Afghanistan they were Buddhist. Today Hazaras are easily recognised, because they are distinctly Asian in appearance.

They are thought to be the descendants of Genghis Khan. They have been targeted by the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan for a long time, certainly since the time of King Abdurrahman inbut they are especially persecuted under the Taliban. The Taliban, who are all Pashtun, are Sunni Muslim. In Afghanistan, and increasingly in lawless areas of Pakistan, relations between the two Muslim groups bring to mind the oppression of Roman Catholics in late 16th and early 17th century England, or more recently in Northern Ireland.

And so we have the unfortunate spectacle of a religious minority who are hated by the religious majority, who look physically different and, adding a historical resonance, Hazara men are circumcised. Pashtun animosity of the Hazaras increased during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hazaras had traditionally been excluded from higher education girls were not allowed to be educated at allbut the Soviets thought all people should be entitled to an education.

The Hazaras welcomed this and sided with the Soviets. The Americans, in pursuit of their goal of ousting the Soviets, set up a fighting force and armed them. They were the Taliban, drawn from the Pashtun majority.

The Taliban thus have historical, political and religious reasons for hating the Hazaras, and they have been peculiarly brutal in their assault. On 8 August the Taliban occupied Mazar-e Sharif. They conducted a murderous spree which lasted three days and killed at least Hazaras. The heart of the research is based on data collected from a total of sixty interviews—thirty from each ethnic group.

These interviews are supplemented by interviews with government officials at both the national and local level; foreign and Pakistani NGO officers; as well as observations made during my two months in Peshawar. The synthesis of these three methods form the bulk of the research.

Two translators were needed for this research: Besides the difficulty in finding a single translator able to communicate in both languages, the animosity between ethnic groups prevents Hazaras from providing forthcoming responses to questions posed by Pashtuns and vice versa. In Peshawar, Afghan neighborhoods are based along ethnic lines. Afghan Uzbeks, for instance live in certain sections of the city in the same way that Hazaras live in well-demarcated neighborhoods.

Pashtuns, since they form the majority in the NWFP, can be found throughout the city. Typically, we approached Hazaras in shops and on the streets asked if they would oblige us with an interview.

Afghanistan - Society

We were often invited to interview refugees in their stores and homes. The duration of each interview was approximately twenty minutes. The Pashtuns we interviewed were found using the same method in areas contiguous to Hazara neighborhoods. All the interviewees were male as Afghan culture discouraged us from speaking with women.

  • The Hazaras
  • Persecution of Hazara people

The two types of questions characterize the interviews: And how many rooms in your home? And why did you move? With the latter set of questions, interviewees grew more candid, recounting stories of interactions with property dealers, the police, and landlords. The interviews returned both quantitative and qualitative responses. These have been compiled in summary tables and can be found in Section Five of the paper. Their interviews represent an effort to reflect the dominant State perspective towards the economic impact of and lawlessness often attributed to Afghans.

This aspect of the research is critical as it sets the general framework for studying the refugee crisis in Peshawar and its policy responses. While responses from government officials provided an overall understanding of refugee issues in Peshawar, interviews with UNHCR and NGOs allowed for a view into the everyday realities of disbursing aid. Since the orientation of NGOs differs from that of public agencies, their perspective completes the picture describing the difficulties faced by urban refugees and what can be done to improve their socio-economic status.

Generally, the officials within government agencies and NGOs did not view Afghan refugees as a group stratified by ethnic division. Limitations The research took place exclusively in Peshawar, Pakistan. Thus, the results obtained are specific to ethnic dynamics of the city.

pashtun and hazara relationship marketing

The condition of the Hazaras in Peshawar, for example, likely differs from that of Hazaras in Quetta. In the latter case, Hazaras are aligned with the local Baluchis to compete for political power with Pashtuns.

No such relationship exists in Peshawar. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt can generalized and are relevant to other refugee situations. Due to the limited time spent in Peshawar, I conducted only sixty interviews. The data collected are therefore indicative rather than representative. In this sense, the research serves as a stepping-stone for future research interested in the relationship between ethno-religious identity and the disbursement of aid.

As mentioned above, I yielded to cultural norms and did not interview women at all. The gender perspective is therefore absent from this analysis. Future research ought to incorporate the views of female refugees.

Pashtuns attacked in brutal raids by rival ethnic groups

In such crises, women are often the most vulnerable and can offer a different perspective on how programs can better serve their needs. The methodological technique employed is biased against the poorest among the Afghan refugee population in Peshawar. Arranging interviews with those found in shops and on the street excluded refugees engaged in day labor or construction work. These segments have been overlooked in the research. The benefit in pitting the Hazaras against the Pashtuns is that differences in responses are pronounced and easily recognized.

The limitation in this method however lies in extrapolating the responses of Hazaras and Pashtuns to other ethnic groups such as the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. Thus, no attempt has been made to differentiate the gray areas within the relationship between ethnicity and aid. The last and most significant limitation is related to the change in the extent and attitude of Afghan refugees since the removal of the Taliban in I have tried to include these recent developments in my analysis but since little attention is given to urban refugees in the first place, it has been difficult to find data other than anecdotal that relate the rate at which urban Afghan refugees are repatriating or whether it is happening at all.

Map of Major Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan Afghanistan is as ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse as any other country in the region. Smaller ethnic groups comprise the remainder of the population Ahady, Tajiks In the north, the Tajik, Uzbek and Turcomen populations share a common Turkic history and affiliate themselves with the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

The Tajiks form the second largest group in Afghanistan. Labeling them as an ethnic group however involves expanding our definition. There exists no recognizable cultural, social or political boundary between the Tajiks and other groups in the country. Tajiks, when asked to identify themselves, responded by naming their valley, area or town Glatzer, Tajiks live all over the country: Most of the people in the provinces north of Kabul are called Tajik and in almost all Pashtun provinces there are important Tajik pockets Glatzer, They speak a Turkish dialect, adhere to Sunni Islam and unlike the Tajiks, are organized in tribes and clans.

The Uzbeks in Afghanistan can be grouped according to their arrival in the country. Some Afghan Uzbeks are autochthonous, having lived in Northern Afghanistan for centuries. The second group of Uzbeks migrated to Afghanistan after the expansion of Tsarist Russia or when Uzbekistan was made a republic of the Soviet Union.

These later Uzbek migrants disassociate themselves from their native Afghan cousins and have formed a distinctive sub-group under the name Muhajerin literally, refugees Glatzer, The relationship between the Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan is characterized by careful cooperation and crafted from the recognition of a common enemy.

Both groups found themselves together on the frontlines during the Afghan-Soviet war. The withdrawal of the Soviets in created a schism among the Mujahideen forces: The turning point in the conflict over control of Afghanistan came when Dostam betrayed Najibullah in to join forces with the Tajiks to conquer Kabul. Subsequently, the Pashtuns garrisoned in Hazarajat, treated the local Hazaras inferiorly and often committed arbitrary acts of cruelty and brutality against them.

This caused great unrest and a deepening hatred between the Hazaras and their Pashtun rulers, causing the Hazaras to reach their tipping point in When a local Pashtun garrison searched the home of a Hazara chieftain for arms, but the pretext was false, the garrison subsequently tied the chieftain up and made him watch while they raped his wife.

This newfound zealous fever fermented fierce resistance against Shah Adbur and his forces. Witnessing the rising tide, Shah Adbur felt he had no choice but to wage a jihad against the Shia Hazaras, and under this casus belli Shah Adbur was able to muster aroundtroops. The Hazaras fought with vigour but the attrition they faced due to lack of rations, led to their demise at the uprising's epicenter of Oruzgan.

At that time Ittihad-i Islami was allied with the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. The military operation was conducted in order to seize control of the Afshar district in west Kabul where the Shia Hezb-e Wahdat militia which was allied to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 's Sunni Hezb-i Islami and backed by Pakistan was based and from where it was shelling civilian areas in northern Kabul.

The operation also intended to capture Wahdat leader Abdul Ali Mazari. The Afshar district, situated on the slopes of Mount Afshar west of Kabul, is a densely populated district.

The area is predominantly inhabited by Shia Hazara people. The Afshar military operation escalated into what became known as the Afshar massacre when the Saudi backed Wahhabi militia of Ittihad-e-Islami went on a rampage through Afshar, killing, raping, looting and burning houses.

Two out of nine Islamic State sub-commanders, Anwar Dangar later joined the Taliban and Mullah Izzat, were also reported as leading troops that carried out abuses. The Islamic State government in collaboration with the then enemy militia of Hezb-e Wahdat as well as in cooperation with Afshar civilians established a commission to investigate the crimes that had taken place in Afshar.

The commission found that around 70 people died during the street fighting and between and people were abducted and never returned by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's men. These abducted victims were most likely killed or died in captivity. A mass murder was carried out there by Taliban in May in which 31 people were reported dead.

Twenty-six of the victims were Ismaili Hazara from Baghalan province. Their remains were found to the northeast of the pass, in a neighborhood known as Hazara Mazari, on the border between Baghlan and Samngan provinces.