China–United Kingdom relations - Wikipedia
China on Friday warned Britain ties were at risk unless it took steps to The China Daily said Britain was trying to “curry favour” with the United. Chinese-United Kingdom relations more commonly known as British–Chinese relations, Anglo-Chinese relations and Sino-British relations, refers to the. Brexit means the UK is seeking new partners, but how much is it willing Hinkley Point project has united all manner of experts (engineers, physicists, to ask difficult questions about the nature of its relationship with China.
European companies continue to complain of problems with market access. Beijing regularly deploys divide and rule tactics against the EU, using economic carrots and sticks to reward or punish European states. Whether Britain will be able to conclude a post-Brexit trade agreement with China depends on whether it will remain in a customs union with the EU. If we assume that Britain will indeed be able to conclude independent trade agreements, what challenges might it face with regards to China?
The developed Western economies all agree on the main problems in trade with China: Over the past decade or so, the US, the EU and Japan have made some progress in persuading the Chinese government to alter its policies in these areas — but that progress has been slow and limited.
Could Britain establish closer relations with China following Brexit?
Unless Britain is willing to offer significant concessions to China, it is difficult to see the Chinese government offering the UK a trade deal better than those that may be on the table for the EU, the US and Japan. Britain could offer China preferential access to the British market in the hope that would persuade China to reciprocate, but that might threaten British industries and, since Britain would need such a deal more than China, the terms might not be attractive. Radical advocates of free trade argue that the UK could unilaterally open its economy to goods and services from China and other countries, with losses in industries facing cheaper imports offset by new economic activity generated by the process of creative destruction.
British companies and workers, however, are unlikely to find this a palatable option. What about possible new Chinese investment in Britain?
Again, the Chinese are hard-headed and are unlikely to invest unless the terms are strongly beneficial. The planned new Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is illustrative. Successive British governments negotiated the Hinkley agreement with a French-Chinese consortium.
A ‘golden era’ in China-UK relations. Really, Auntie May?
When it became clear that the terms were a bad deal for the British taxpayer and energy user, the government nonetheless went ahead, fearing that the alternative was a collapse of the agreement. A British government needing post-Brexit investment for both economic and political reasons is unlikely to be able to secure better terms from China in future.
The Belt and Road Initiative, the flagship economic development strategy of the Xi era, seeks to promote economic linkages and position China more centrally in the global economy through the coordinated development of new infrastructure and new interstate cooperation modes. Over the past two decades, China has built a relatively robust commercial rule of law regime even in a context where the Party remains final arbiter.
In recent years, China has continued to use the special zone model, authorizing several Pudong-style New Areas and a set of free-trade zones.
There is little question that foreign businesses will continue to find growth opportunities in China. While never letting go of the netting, the Party-state has allowed wide openings in the economy and in society.
The trouble with fishing nets, however, is that they can be hauled in. As Xi Jinping has consolidated power sincethe lines of political control in China have tightened, and many economic, social, and cultural spaces that were once loosely policed are now closing.
Xi is an avowed Leninistand his stern leadership style has suffused the Party apparatus as a whole.The Darker Side To Britain And China’s Relationship
Once-slack links between the Party and enterprises, educational institutions, and other organizations have been reinvigorated. Recent moves by the Party to re-assert authority and enhance discipline are not at all certain to offer advantages to foreign firms or to the private sector more broadly.
The activation of Party cells in foreign businesses and academic ventures that operate in China have sent shivers through the expatriate community. The domestic private sector, too, is facing tighter Party oversight and guidance. Inthe central government announced its intention to take equity stakes in leading technology sector firms, positioning Beijing to exert control from within as well as without.
The clearest manifestations of intensified Party-state control have been in the political realm. The aggressive and far-reaching anti-corruption campaign Xi Jinping launched in has enjoyed some level of public support, but it has often been conducted by harsh, extra-legal means. Members of the public have also faced an escalation of political and ideological control in recent years.
How China-UK relations have evolved - BBC News
Online and academic spaces of discussion have narrowed. The Party-state has stepped up pressure on perceived troublemakers in society, from political activists, human rights lawyers, and public intellectuals to unauthorized capital-city residents.
But other aspects are more institutionalized, and could feed a repressive atmosphere for years to come.
Underpinning the initial U. In crafting a new relationship with the Chinese after leaving the EU, the U. Not only is the number of potential issues growing, but soon the U. International policy around human rights, issues such as the arms embargo, and decisions over the design of the U. There is a perception among some commercial commentators and political actors that frictions in the U.
These actors argue that the vital importance accorded by the Chinese to economic development has implied a separation of the economic realm from the political one: This may have been a reasonable premise upon which to base U. A spate of recent news reports suggesting the influence of Chinese interests over politicians in Europe, New Zealand, and Australia have fueled concerns that liberal democratic institutions around the world are being subverted by authoritarian regimes.
There is similar anxiety in settings like Australia and the United States about perceived Chinese influence into the higher education sector, whether in the form of direct coercion of academics like Australian scholar Feng Chongyiorganizational control via the proliferation of Confucius Institutes, or more subtle influence from large-scale Chinese donors.
While such trends have already shifted public debates in key U.